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LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS IN EQUITY
IN NEW YORK
"My Galli-gaskins that have long withstood
The Winters' fury, and encroaching frosts
By TIME subdued (what will not TIME subdue!)."'
E VER since the reign of Henry III there have been statutes
in England limiting the time within which rights might
be asserted in courts of law.2  The unfairness of permitting
a cause of action to be held forever as a sword over the head
of the debtor or his descendants was thus early perceived
and a great body of law has arisen that deals with the prac-
tical application of these periods of limitation to actual
cases. Here the requirements of strict justice must give
way to practical necessities, for it is obvious that if six years
is the period of limitation for a particular action, a suit
which may be brought on the last day of the sixth year will
be forever barred if it is not brought until the first day of
the seventh year. Here as elsewhere when we are dealing
with rules of law, the exigencies of practical administration
must control the urge to fairness which is after all basic
in all jurisprudence.
In equity, where the rigid rules of the common law do
not ordinarily obtain, the limitation of actions is an espe-
cially difficult problem. To solve it equity very early devel-
oped the doctrine of laches, 3 a natural corollary of the equi-
table maxim that only those who are vigilant to protect their
rights can expect redress in a court of conscience. But the
doctrine of laches has seldom been applied to defeat a cause
of action in equity because of the mere lapse of time, without
more.4 It is necessary to show some disadvantage, however
'From J. Phillip's Splendid Shilling; Gibbons, A Treatise on the Law
of Limitation and Prescription (1835).
"3 Blackstone's Comm. (1791) p. 189.
*1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed., 1918), Sec. 419. "A court of
equity which is never active in relief against conscience or public convenience,
has always refused its aid to stale demands, where the party has slept upon
his rights, and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth
this court into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence"
citing Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619 (1900).
"Seligson v. Weiss, 222 App. Div. 634, 227 N. Y. Supp. 338 (lst Dept.
1928). In addition, it has been stated that where an action seeks an equitable
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slight, accruing to the defendant before he can avail himself
of the defense of laches.5
It is very dubious whether practical necessity requires
anything more than the application of the doctrine of laches
to equitable suits plus the refusal of a court of equity in
its sound discretion to give relief to one who has slept on
his rights for an unreasonable length of time. Were the law
to be left in this state, the determination of whether or not
a particular suit in equity may be brought would depend
on judicial discretion to be exercised with regard to the
state of facts as presented in the record. While this is per-
haps too great a swing in the direction of individual jus-
tice, it would have the advantage of making unnecessary
the application of a rigid period of time beyond which a
cause of action in equity could not be brought. On the
other hand, it would render entirely unpredictable the re-
sult that may follow a more or less protracted delay to
enforce equitable rights.
In New York, as in most jurisdictions, there are stat-
utes enacting specific periods of limitations to various causes
of action, and finally a blanket statute, section 53 of the
Civil Practice Act, which provides that "An action, the
limitation of which is not specifically prescribed in this
article, must be commenced wthin ten years after the cause
of action accrues." 6
remedy in aid of or to enforce a legal right suit cannot be barred by the in-
terposition of the doctrine of laches. Galaway v. M. E. R. Co., 128 N. Y.
132, 28 N. E. 479 (1891); White v. Miller, 78 Misc. 428, 139 N. Y. Supp.
660 (1912). It therefore appears that the doctrine of laches may be invoked
only where the remedy sought is purely equitable in nature.
"Laches, in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works
a disadvantage to another. So long as parties are in the same condition, it
matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits
allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no step to enforce
them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then
enforced, delay becomes inequitable, and operates as an estoppel against the
assertion of the right. The disadvantage may come from a loss of evidence,
change of title, intervention of equities and other causes; but when a court
sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other, it is a ground
for denial of relief." Chase v. Chase, 20 R. I. 202 at 203, 204 (1897).
'Formerly Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 388 (1877) and previous to that
Code of Procedure, Sec. 97 (1848). See Hayden, Code of Procedure (1848)
p. 215.
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It has been said by the courts in this state that this
section provides a statutory limitation of time within which
all actions in equity must be brought. If this is so, it
follows that as soon as a cause of action in equity has ac-
crued the statute begins to run and that ten years there-
after the cause of action is barred and may be successfully
defeated by pleading the statute of limitations. That re-
sult has actually followed this line of reasoning in many
groups of cases where merely equitable relief was sought.
Thus an action to establish and enforce a constructive trust,8
or an action to secure an accounting, 9 to be successfifl,
must be commenced within the statutory period. So too,
other actions in equity for specific performance,10 for fraud "I
and mistake," reformation,' 3  rescission 14 and cancella-
'Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185. 193 (1885). In Gilmore v. Ham,
142 N. Y. 1 at 7, 36 N. E. 826 at 827 (1894) Finch, J. stated, "Under the law
of this state there is a fixed limitation for every cause of action, whether
legal or equitable."
- Pierson v. Morgan, 121 N. Y. 705, 24 N. E. 1100 (1890) aff'g 52 Hun
611, 4 N. Y. Supp. 898 (1889); Finnegan v. McGuffog, 139 App. Div. 899,
123 N. Y. Supp. 539 (1st Dept. 1910) aff'd 203 N. Y. 342, 96 N. E. 1015(1911); Yeoman v. Townshend, 74 Hun 625. 26 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1893);
Chorrmann v. Bachmann, 119 App. Div. 146, 104 N. Y. Supp. 151 (2nd Dept.
1907); Jessup v. Witherbee Real Est. & Impr. Co., 63 Misc. 649, 117 N. Y.
Supp. 276 (1909) appeal dismissed 139 App. Div. 918, 124 N. Y. Supp. 1118(2nd Dept. 1910).
'Treadwell v. Clark, 73 App. Div. 473, 77 N. Y. Supp. 350 (1st Dept.
1902); Monroe v. Turner, 114 App. Div. 634, 100 N. Y. Supp. 27 (4th Dept.
1906) ; (as to accounting between partners) Gray v. Green 125 N. Y. 203,
26 N. E. 253 (1891), id. 142 N. Y. 316, 37 N. E. 124 (1894); Gilmore v.
Ham, supra note 7; Sterling v. Chapin, 102 App. Div. 589, 92 N. Y. Supp.
904 (1st Dept. 1905); Hutchinson v. Sperry, 79 Misc. 523, 140 N. Y. Supp.
220 (1913); (by trustee) Bushe v. Wright, 118 App. Div. 320. 103 N. Y.
Supp. 410 (1st Dept. 1907) aff'd 195 N. Y. 509, 88 N. E. 1116 (1909) ; Miller
v. Parkhurst, 45 Hun 590, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 759 (1887).
" Bruce v. Tilson 25 N. Y. 194 (1862); McCotter v. Lawrence, 4 Hun
107 (N. Y. 1875); Kelly v. Potter, 16 N. Y. Supp. 446 (1891).
Carr v. Thompson, 87 N. Y. 160 (1881) ; Bosley v. N. M. Co., 123 N.
Y. 550, 25 N. E. 990 (1890); Continental Securities v. Belmont, 168 App. Div.
483, 154 N. Y. Supp. 54 (2nd Dept. 1915) aff'd 222 N. Y. 673, 119 N. E. 1036(1918).
"Salisbury v. Morss, 55 N. Y. 675 (1874) ; Gallup v. Bernd. 132 N. Y.
370, 30 N. E. 743 (1892) ; Oakes v. Howell, 27 How. Pr. 145 (N. Y. 1864).
"Day v. Town of New Lots, 107 N. Y. 148, 13 N. E. 915 (1887);
Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. 1000 (1894).
" Latour v. Latour, 134 La. 342, 64 So. 133 (1914) ; Marlborough v. Round-
tree, 128 La. 39, 54 So. 463 (1911); McLean v. Stith, 112 S. W. 355 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908); Hawkins v. Blake, 69 W. Va. 190, 71 S. E. 191 (1911);
McCann v. Welch, 106 Wisc. 142, 81 N. AV. 996 (1900).
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tion,15 all must be commenced within the period provided
for by section 53.16 In the following pages we will analyze
and classify the cases dealing with the application of periods
of limitation to causes of action in equity in order to de-
termine to what extent the rule referred to and thus ap-
plied has been carried out in practice.
(1) CONCURRENT ACTIONS IN LAW AND EQUITY.
Another very general proposition which is frequently
found in the cases and texts is that where a cause of action
may be brought concurrently in law or in equity, the statute
applicable to the legal remedy applies also to the equitable
remedy. 17 Here again the period of limitation may be ex-
tended or contracted by a determination as to whether or not
the plaintiff might have secured in a court of law the relief
asked for in equity. The rule as stated above appears ele-
mentary albeit its application entails a more serious con-
sideration. It was held in Borst v. Corey,' 8 in an action to
enforce an equitable lien for the unpaid purchase price of
land that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law on the
debt and, having failed to prosecute his action within the
time allowed at law, he was forever barred from relief in
equity. The lien sought by plaintiff was declared to be a
mere incident of the debt. The soundness of the reasoning
in this decision has been questioned 19 but the rule fol-
'
5Ibid.
18The enumeration of equitable actions here set forth is not intended to
be exclusive.
17 Butler v. Johnson, 111 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 643 (1888) ; Keys v. Leopold,
241 N. Y. 189, 149 N. E. 828 (1925); Carmody, New York Practice (1930),
Sec. 409. "The statute of limitations does not in terms apply to suits in equity,
but courts of equity are regarded as within the spirit and meaning, so that
where remedies are concurrent at law and in equity, the statutory limitations
are applied to proceedings in equity as well as at law" see also Sec. 430;
Wood, Limitation of Actions (4th ed. 1916), Sec. 58. "Courts of equity,
although not in all cases bound by the statute of limitations, unless expressly
brought within its provisions have nevertheless acted in this respect in analogy
to courts of law, and given effect to the statute in all cases of concurrent
jurisdiction; and it may be said that in such cases a court of equity will no
more disregard the statute than a court of law."
18 15 N. Y. 505 (1857).
" In Hurlbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y. 295, 28 N. E. 638 (1891) plaintiff
sought to foreclose a mortgage on property after the action 'on the debt was
barred. A foreclosure decree was granted, the Court holding that when the
security for a debt is a lien on property the lien is not impaired because the
remedy for the recovery of the debt is barred. Commenting upon the decision
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lowed.20  It would seem that the better rule, in accord with
general equitable principles, would be to permit one to secure
a lien in equity though the debt be barred at law.
The situation is further complicated by the frequent
recurrence of the instance in which a cause of action in
equity is brought for an accounting in situations where the
sole aim of the plaintiff is to recoer a sum of money re-
tained or held by the defendant and where the complete
relief desired by the plaintiff could be had in an action for
debt, and by the further fact that a court of law cannot
enter a decree ordering an accounting. In such cases it
might be said that the actual accounting is merely incidental
to the relief sought by the plaintiff, namely, the collection
of a fixed sum due the plaintiff, and hence governed by the
law period of limitation. Yet such an action is deemed an
equitable one and therefore the equity and not the law period
of limitation prevails. 21
Again, where the defendant is a trustee- either e$T male-
ficio or of an express trust, it would seem that there is
always jurisdiction in equity to compel the performance of
the trust in spite of the fact that the whole action to be
performed by the trustee is the mere payment of money. Yet
even in such cases there is some doubt about the application
of sec. 53 of the Civil Practice Act.
In an action brought by a client against a firm of lawyers
for money converted by one of the members of the firm
without the knowledge of the others but deposited in the
firm bank accounts, the Court had before it a situation of
in Borst v. Corey, Earl, J., at 300, 28 N. E. at 639 stated: "The reasoning
by which the result was reached in that case is not altogether satisfactory ** "
2 Plet v. Wilson, 134 N. Y. 139, 31 N. E. 336 (1892). In this case
the Court stated that the plaintiff's remedies were either in ejectment, to re-
cover possession of the property or, if he affirmed the contract, he had a
choice of two remedies, 1. to recover back the balance of the purchase price
or "2. A suit in equity to foreclose the contract. Whether the vendor
should elect to enforce the collection of his debt through a personal judgment
against his vendees or by means of a foreclosure and sale of the property,
his action would be on the contract which the vendees had failed to per-
form. Sections 380 and 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide that
an action upon a contract, obligation or liability, express or implied, except
a judgment or sealed instrument must be commenced within six years after
the cause of action has accrued."
' See cases supra note 9.
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a kind here discussed.2 The case is extremely difficult to
understand. On the one hand the Court states as a fact
that the defendants received no benefit from the money
which was converted by one of their partners.2 3 And on the
other hand the Court holds that the action is for money
had and received and in the nature of unjust enrichment.2 4
Of course it is impossible to see how anybody can be en-
riched by money or property from which he has no benefit
whatsoever. The Court also states as a settled principle of
law that where an agent receives a sum of money from his
principal for specific purposes he is a debtor and not a
trustee.26 This is of course directly contrary to well estab-
lished principles and renders the case defiant of classifica-
tion.26  As a ruling however on the statute of limitations,
it is interesting in that the Court strips the complaint of
all the equitable relief demanded therein and concludes that
since a cause of action at law would have provided the
plaintiff with all the relief that he sought or procured in
the action in equity, the case is governed by the six-year
statute. On the whole it would seem that the courts have
pressed the Statute of Limitations in every case where the
relief sought by the plaintiff might have been obtained in
a court of law in spite of the fact that a valid cause of ac-
tion in equity also existed.
(2) ACTIONS IN EQUITY UNAFFECTED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In spite of the fact that the courts have said that sec-
tion 53 applies to all cases in equity, there are a number
of equitable actions which are permitted to be brought even
' Model Building & Loan Assn. v. Reeves, 236 N. Y. 331, 140 N. E. 715(1923).
Ibid. at 336, 140 N. E. at 716.
Ibid. at 338, 140 N. E. at 717.
Ibid. at 339, 140 N. E. at 718.
-'2 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (7 ed., 1929) Sec. 206. "The relation
of principal and agent is a fiduciary one, and the same observations apply as
to other relations of trust and confidence. [The agent is under the same'duty
as a trustee not to attempt personal gain directly or indirectly by purchasing or
dealing with his principal's property. He becomes a constructive trustee when,
in violation of his duty to his principal, or by misusing the latter's funds, he
purchases real estate for himself]."
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though more than ten years have elapsed since the right
to bring the action has accrued. Reference is made to in-
stances like an action to remove a cloud on title.2 7 It is
said that this is a cause of action which is constantly ac-
cruing and hence the statute of limitations could never bar
it. Yet an action to quiet title by one out of possession
of the real property has been held to be barred by the passage
of the ten-year period.2 s The justice of this distinction will
not be questioned. It will be more difficult however to
subsume it under the general principles enunciated by the
courts.
An action to quiet title, when it is brought by one in
possession is ordinarily purely formal and is instituted for
the purpose of clearing the record rather than for the pur-
pose of establishing rights. As such it will frequently not
be vigilantly pressed, the party having the right to main-
tain it being of no practical urgency to do so. On the other
hand, when the plaintiff is out of possession, the action is
frequently preliminary to another action to regain posses-
sion and consequently involves consideration of substance
rather than form. Nevertheless if the dictum of the court 29
that section 53 covers all equitable actions is strictly ap-
plied, it will be difficult to explain these cases.
In a similar class are the cases giving the relief of in-
junction against a continuing trespass or nuisance.30 Here
the cause of action is said not to be barred until the period
of prescription has raised the presumption of a grant to
'Miner v. Beekman, 50 N. Y. 337 (1872); Pea. ex rel. Townshend v.
Cody, 50 Super. Ct. 394 (N. Y. 1884) aff'd 99 N. Y. 620 (1884); M. L. Ins.
Co. v. Corey, 135 N. Y. 326, 31 N. E. 1095 (1892); Dooley v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 158 App. Div. 429, 143 N. Y. Supp. 650 (2nd Dept. 1913).
2 German Savings Bank v. Wagner, 164 App. Div. 234, 149 N. Y. Supp.
654 (1st Dept. 1914).
' SupIra note 7.
2 Galaway v. Met. El. Rwy. Co., 128 N. Y. 132 at 143, 28 N. E. 479 at
481 (1891). "The questions raised are answered by elementary principles
established in this state by numerous reported cases. They are found in the
two propositions that continuous injuries to real estate caused by the main-
tenance of a nuisance or other unlawful structure create separate causes of
action barred only by the running of the statute against the successive tres-
passes, and the further principle that no lapse of time or inaction merely
on the part of the plaintiff during the erection and maintenance of such
structure, unless it has continued for the length of time necessary to effect
a change of title in the property claimed to have been injured, is sufficient
to defeat the right of the owner to damages."
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the defendant. Again the courts indulge in a polite fiction
that the maintenance of the nuisance renders a cause of
action to enjoin it a constantly accruing one and hence it
cannot be barred by the statute. Less can be said for the
merits of this exception than for the prior one for it would
seem that a period of ten years is ample time for an in-
dividual to decide to institute an action to enjoin a con-
tinuing trespass or nuisance, and again, these cases are not
to be reconciled with the proposition that section 53 covers
all equitable actions.
Similarly, the rights of a cestui against the trustee of
an express trust are not barred by section 53 of the Civil
Practice Act.31 Here again the relationship being a con-
tinuing one, the courts suggest that the cause of action
accrues from time to time. It must appear however that
the defendant is not a trustee ex maleficio or trustee by
implication, for in such case the statute begins to run from
the time the wrong was committed.32
(3) FRAUD AS AN ELEMENT IN TOLLING THE STATUTE.
Where an action is predicated on a fraud practiced on
the complaining party the Civil Practice Act provides that
the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until the
discovery by the injured party of the facts constituting the
fraud.3 3 While that provision was not re-enacted as part of
section 53 it has nevertheless been held to apply thereto and
a cause of action in equity for fraud is not barred until the
expiration of the ten-year period of limitation. 34  The insis-
tence, however, that the fraud allowed must be actual and
not constructive fraud 35 would seem to be open to serious
criticism inasmuch as constructive fraud is a name fre-
" Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. 190, 216 (N. Y. 1817) ; Kane v. Blood-
good, 7 Johns. 90 (N. Y. 1823) ; Ward v. Smith, 3 Sandf. 592 (N. Y. 1846).
'
2 Ibid. and also Lannier v. Stoddard, 103 N. Y. 672 (1886).
At law, formerly, a cause of action based on fraud began to run from
the date of perpetration of the fraud. Miller v. Wood, 116 N. Y. 351, 22 N.
E. 553 (1889). But in equity the period of computation was measured from
the time plaintiff knew of the facts constituting the fraud until the period
of limitation passed. Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308,
144 N. E. 592 (1924).
' Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., supra note 33.
Spallhotz v. Sheldon, 158 App. Div. 367, 143 N. Y. Supp. 417 (3rd Dept.,
1913).
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quently given to conduct regarded as fraudulent in equity
though not at law. And if the provisions with regard to
fraud are meant to cover equitable as well as legal actions, 6
and if section 53 applies to equitable actions, it would seem
to follow that the provision as to legal fraud should also
extend to equitable fraud on familiar canons of construction.
Yet, obviously, the current of authority is the other way.
It may be said that the courts are given to a more flex-
ible standard of time limitation when the cause of action
is based on fraud since it first decides at what time the
plaintiff became aware of the fraud practiced on him. And
with a variance of facts peculiar to each cause the court
is at liberty to determine at what time the cause of action
first accrued. It is reasonable to conclude that the rule
is a necessary one under the circumstances and while it
does not give vent to greater predictability as to the de-
termination of the existence of a cause of action it does
accomplish justice in the ordinary instance.
(4) THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION.
Since section 53 bars the cause of action within ten
years from the date of its accrual, the courts have a weapon
whereby the period within which to bring an action may
be limited or extended by a decision fixing the date of the
accrual of the cause. It would seem that the date of the
accrual of the cause of action of the plaintiff is a matter
of simple determination, but it is submitted that no sys-
tematic rules can be gleaned from the cases. Thus it has
been held that an action by one joint debtor to charge the
other for his portion of the joint debt paid pursuant to a
judgment accrues at the entry of the original judgment
against the joint debtors 38 and on the other hand it has
'Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., supra note 33 at 310, 144 N. E.
at 592. "In Equity the right of action accrues upon the discovery of the
facts constituting the fraud."
I Supra note 35.
28Hofferberth v. Nash, 191 N. Y. 446, 84 N. E. 400 (1908). At 446, 84 N.
E. at 401 Bartlett, J., stated: "* * * the plaintiff's cause of action does not
accrue until the recovery of the original judgment. It does then accrue, how-
ever, co instante and from that moment it is within the plaintiff's power * * *
to charge the property of the unserved joint debtor. I can see no escape from
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been held that an action in equity to recover stock stolen
from a pledgee and sold to the defendant does not accrue
until the plaintiff learns that the stock is in the possession
of the defendant.39  In the former case, the plaintiff is
barred if he has made no move for ten years to recover his
share of judgment. In the latter case, the plaintiff will
never be barred, unless he has first learned of the wrong
done to him. The inconsistency between the principles ap-
plied in the respective cases referred to indicates how elastic
the statute of limitations may become in its practical ap-
plication.
In the celebrated case of Rhinelander v. Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co.,40 a cause of action by bondholders against
a trustee under a trust indenture was held to be barred
under section 388 of the Code of Civil Procedure.41  The
court in the very elaborate opinion which detailed the duties
and liabilities of trustees under trust indentures came to
the conclusion that a cause of action accrued against the
trustee. It was held however, that the trustee had breached
not express duties but implied duties, and that hence the
Statute of Limitations ran against the cause of action from
the date of its accrual. The pivotal point of the case, how-
ever, is the determination of this date, a point which is
somewhat elided in the lengthy opinion of the Court. It
was held in that case that the cause of action accrued not
on the date of the wrongful acts of the trustee but rather
on the date of the issuance of the bonds by the trustee. This
effectively barred the plaintiff's cause of action, and the
opinion reads as a lecture to trustees generally on the man-
ner in which they should conduct their trusts. One feels
that the Court in administering its discipline is saying to
the trustees in effect, we will not hold you liable in this
case, but we are indicating to you that in the future you
must conduct yourself along different lines. From the point
the conclusion that the ten years' Statute of Limitations then begins to run
against him, and if he allows that period to pass without commencing suit
his right to sue is gone."
" Treadwell v. Clark, 190 N. Y. 51, 82 N. E. 505 (1907) aff'g 114 App.
Div. 493, 100 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dept. 1906).
4 172 N. Y. 512, 65 N. E. 499 (1902).
' 
1 Now Civil Practice Act, Section 53, see stpra note 6.
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of view of a determination as to the date of the accrual
of a cause of action this decision appears to be a very un-
satisfactory one.
Reference to cases wherein the relief sought is an ac-
counting between partners 42 or where some other fiduciary
relationship 43 is established is appropriate here. In Gil-
more v. Ham,44 plaintiff sought an accounting from a liqui-
dating partner. The decisive point in the case was the
Court's decision as to when the cause of action accrued in
plaintiff's favor. The rule there set forth was that the right
of action for an accounting accrued when the liquidator,
under the circumstances of the particular case, has had a
reasonable time within which to perform his duty, when it
ought to have been fully completed and when the liqui-
dator is in fault if it is not. It is obvious that such a rule
is at best extremely indefinite and will undoubtedly result
in uncertainty of application. Indeed, cognizant of the ex-
treme indefiniteness of such a test, Finch, J., for the court
stated, "I should be glad if it were possible to adopt some
more definite rule than the one I have stated, but only spe-
cific legislation can give us that." 45
A remarkable decision of the Appellate Division in the
First Department in the case of Small v. Sullivan 46 has
thrown the whole matter of limitations in equity into a state
of confusion. In that case the Court applied to an action
in equity the ten-year period of limitation prescribed by
section 53, and said:
"We take the view expressed at Special Term
that the ten-year statute of limitations applies, and
as stated in the opinion there filed, that 'the period
of limitation begins to run from the date when the
plaintiffs' alleged loss was ascertained and com-
putable.'" 47
42 See cases collected, smtra note 9.
3 Ibid.
"Supra note 9.
' Ibid. at 9, 36 N. E. at 828.
218 App. Div. 612, 219 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1st Dept. 1926) mod'f'd (on
another point) 245 N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261 (1927).
", Ibid. at 622, 219 N. Y. Supp. at 44.
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The difficulty with this pronouncement is of coursE
obvious. Section 53 expressly states that the period of
limitation begins to run on the date of the accrual of the
action. If fraud is alleged, then, perhaps the statute does
not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of the fraud.
Nowhere does the statute provide that the period of limi-
tation begins to run from the date when the loss is ascer-
tained and computable. That was an action by bondholders
to recover from directors for a wrongful distribution of the
assets of the corporation by way of dividends to its stock-
holders. The action accrued of course when the distribu-
tion was made, and the statute, if section 53 applies, began
to run on that date. To postpone it to a later date would
seem to be to ignore the entire statute while retaining the
period of limitation prescribed therein. There is no legis-
lative warrant for the dictum pronounced by the Court
and it is submitted that it is contrary to holdings of the
Court of Appeals in similar cases. Nevertheless, the case
stanids as an unreversed determination of an appellate tri-
bunal and is a standing source of confusion to lawyers and
litigants. It is impossible to reconcile it with any known
principles involved in the decisions applying the Statute
of Lmitations in equity, for if it be said that the Court is
proceeding on judicial and non-statutory grounds, the ten-
year period is entirely without precedent. We have here-
tofore demonstrated that aside from statute, causes of ac-
tion in equity are without definite limitation.
CONCLUSION.
To the uninitiate, it would seem that the regulation
of the periods of time within which actions must be brought
is a particularly fertile field for the enactment of rules
which might be codified by legislation. However true this
may be with regard to causes of action at law, we have seen
that at least in equity the attempt to do so has broken down
In practice. A not negligible series of cases dictate the
conclusion that courts of equity even with regard to mat-
ter of this type, find it impossible to submit to the fetters
of legislation. In spite of the fact that principles of equity
tend to crystallize, it nevertheless remains true that through
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS IN EQUITY
the process of equitable jurisprudence courts of law in com-
mon law countries are constantly taking cognizance of those
individual differences which are ever appearing and which
must be considered if the administration of justice is to be
elastic and satisfactory. We must overcome here, as else-
where, the desire to be completely mathematical about any
branch of law. Human relations cannot be tabulated or
fixed for all time by formulae worked out with a slide-rule.
Play must be given to the joints of a machine. And even
when we are dealing with matters specially amenable to
rules of law, these considerations are of the utmost impor-
tance. Long ago, Dean Pound pointed out the fact that
law consists of many other ingredients besides rules. 48 The
standards and policies of the law have always been felt to
be the realm within which judicial discretion and individual
justice is worked out. But many lawyers have generally
been under the impression that in the sphere of rules, some
kind of mathematical precision is possible. We have seen
how in the difficult matter of limitations of actions, the
hope has not been fulfilled and that even here judicial de-
cision must grope with problems of policy and take into
account facts and circumstances which cannot be subsumed
under fixed classifications or mathematical calculations.
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"' Pound, Administrative Application of Legal Standards (1919), 44 A. B.
A., 454: "But in truth a modern legal system is much more complex. We
have rules, in the sense in which a real-property lawyer thinks of them, but we
have much besides; and I venture to think we shall understand the matter much
better by distinguishing rules, principles, conceptions and standards. This may
seem unduly complex. But life, which law is to govern, is a complex thing, and
modern law requires and possesses a diversity of instruments for the purpose."
